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1. This hypothetical is not based on any reported decision; it is simply for illustration.
2. Arbitration filing fees vary by firm and size of the dispute.  As an example, filing fees for a
$250,000 dispute to be resolved by the International Centre for Dispute Resolution total $2,750, plus a
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INTRODUCTION1
Little Grill Guy, LLP, (LGG) is a small Pittsburgh firm whose primary
business is making and selling high-end gas grills for outdoor use.  Recently,
a famous chef used LGG’s top-of-the-line model when preparing a meal on a
very popular Japanese cooking game show.  As often happens when American
culture is injected into the Japanese limelight, Japanese consumers have been
clamoring for LGG products since the episode aired.  LGG has started
negotiations with Tokyo-Mart, Inc., the largest commercial retailer in Japan.
Despite its recent fame in Japan, LGG is still a small firm in a small industry
and has relatively little bargaining power compared to the retail giant.
These negotiations are difficult for LGG.  While it knows that the
Japanese market would yield sales that it desperately needs to stay afloat,
currently its production line has such high overhead that it cannot manufacture
and sell grills at a very high margin.  Therefore, the sale price of the grills to
Tokyo-Mart is a point upon which lawyers for LGG cannot compromise.  The
astute counsel for Tokyo-Mart knows this and uses LGG’s inflexibility to
negotiate harsh terms into the agreement.  It is in this environment that the
firms negotiate a choice-of-forum clause into the agreement.
If Tokyo-Mart were actually the conspicuous American retail chain of
similar name, the negotiations between it and LGG on choice of forum would
involve a balancing of different concerns between arbitration and litigation.
For example, LGG might balk at the relative exorbitance of arbitral filing
fees,2 or the fact that, as at least one commentator has noted, arbitrators have
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$1,250 “case service fee.”  This is to be paid at the outset of the arbitration and does not include the rate
for the arbitrator(s) or incidental expenses.  AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (2006), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28144.  As a
comparison, filing a similar claim in the United States Federal District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania would cost $350.  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, FEE SCHED ULE (2006), available at http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Pages/fee.htm.
3. On characteristics of arbitrated judgments, and what actually constitutes an arbitral “award,”
see Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal and Beyond: International Commercial Arbitration
and United States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 17 (2002).
4. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].
5. See KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 8 n.62 (1993).
6. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements,
June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions
.text&cid=98 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
7. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, A Global Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 10 ILSA J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 345, 345-46 (2004).
leeway to craft more creative judgments.3  The retailer, on the other hand,
might fear the prospect of long, arduous litigation and the bad press that
accompanies such a public proceeding.
However, because this negotiation is between parties of two different
nationalities, LGG’s concerns over arbitration are tempered by the fact that,
were it even able to negotiate a choice-of-forum clause and receive a favorable
judgment in court, enforcing that litigated judgment is currently far more
difficult than enforcing an arbitral award because of the protections provided
to arbitration proceedings by the New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).4  At present,
the New York Convention is one of the most widely ratified treaties in history
and requires the courts of a member state to respect a decision of an arbitrator
in another.  This treaty has, since 1968, no doubt swayed many firms engaged
in international business who would otherwise choose litigation over
arbitration.  While there is no definitive evidence of how many transactions
have been so influenced, experts have estimated that around 90% of these
kinds of contracts contain an arbitration clause.5
This rubric is about to change.  On June 30, 2005, thirty-nine members
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law signed the Convention
on Choice of Court Agreements (Hague Convention).6  The Hague Convention
is currently awaiting ratification, and most commentators expect that process
to eventually succeed7 as many states, especially the U.S., are interested in
placing their litigated judgments on an equal playing field with arbitral
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8. See Ronald A. Brand, Community Competence for Matters of Judicial Cooperation at the
Hague Conference on Private International Law: A View from the United States, 21 J.L. & COM. 191, 192
(2002) (discussing U.S. requests for the Hague Conference on Private International Law to create a
judgments convention).
9. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).
awards.8  An equal playing field is exactly what the Hague Convention would
create.
Returning to the hypothetical, assume that the Hague Convention has
been adopted by both the U.S. and Japan.  Tokyo-Mart does some research
and discovers that state trial courts in Bentonville, Arkansas, are, for some
reason, consistently persuaded by the arguments of large retail chains.  Tokyo-
Mart inserts a forum-selection clause into its standard form contract for all
purchase agreements, whereby all disputes will be heard in the state courts in
Bentonville, Arkansas.  Little Grill Guy, so concerned in haggling the price
of the sale, either misses the forum-selection clause or ignores it, assuming
performance will not be an issue.  In any event, the term is never negotiated.
Six months go by and Little Grill Guy is performing just as it said it
would.  Tokyo-Mart’s performance in the Japanese market, however, is less
than stellar.  Profits are down, recent bad press regarding the firm’s failure to
contribute to the Japanese social security system has hurt its image, and
competitors are gaining ground.  Executives are desperate.  Poring over their
recent paperwork, they realize that LGG missed its February shipment to
Tokyo-Mart’s stateside export firm by one day.  (The shipment was due
Sunday, February 1, which just happened to be Super Bowl Sunday, a serious
impediment to any business in the Pittsburgh area.)  Calling this failure a
“total breach of contract,” Tokyo-Mart’s American counsel files a complaint
in Arkansas state court.  The grills marked for shipment to Japan never passed
through Arkansas, although LGG does do business in the state and is subject
to personal jurisdiction.
Pittsburgh counsel for LGG arrives harried and late in the Bentonville
court only to be told that her application to appear pro hac vice has been
denied.  LGG executives find a local attorney who had no part in the
negotiation of the contract and no prior knowledge of the business relationship
or inner workings of his new client.  He soon realizes that while the suit could
have merit, the litigation of the claim in Arkansas is vastly inconvenient and
likely designed simply to harass or vex his client.  Accordingly, he files a
motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens.  This doctrine instructs that
although many courts may have the power to adjudicate a dispute, they may
not be the appropriate venues given matters of convenience and comity.9
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10. Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(2).
11. See, e.g., Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on
Choice of Court Agreements: Draft Report at 23, Prelim. Doc. No. 26 (Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd26e.pdf [hereinafter Draft Report] (prepared by Masato Dogauchi
& Trevor C. Hartley).
12. Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(1).
13. See Piper Aircaft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981).
14. Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(1), 2(2).
15. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505 (1947); Davis v. Farmers’ Co-op. Equity Co.,
262 U.S. 312, 315 (1923).
Tokyo-Mart’s attorneys respond that the text of the Hague Convention
prevents the court named in the choice-of-court clause from dismissing a case
arising out of a valid contract.10
Tokyo-Mart’s argument is likely to prevail.  The rationale behind the
Hague Conference’s decision to deny courts the discretion to decline
jurisdiction stems from the concern that forum non conveniens and similar
doctrines are confusing and unpredictable as applied.11  Rather than allow a
court to use complicated measures to decline jurisdiction over two parties who
have negotiated to litigate under that court’s rules and watchful eye, the Hague
Convention makes jurisdiction mandatory for courts named in a choice-of-
forum agreement.12  Therefore, Little Grill Guy will be exposed to a court
chosen solely for its bias, could be massively inconvenienced, and could be
the recipient of an unfair or imbalanced judgment, now enforceable anywhere
in the world.
In making the decision to entirely cut out forum non conveniens and other
methods of declining jurisdiction, the Hague Conference missed a valuable
opportunity to appropriately codify a system for declining jurisdiction in
international contract cases, and its bright-line rule will likely produce unfair
and inefficient results.  It is likely that parties with large amounts of
bargaining power will take advantage of the lack of forum non conveniens and
engage in forum shopping when negotiating their contracts, a phenomenon
forum non conveniens specifically combats.13  Moreover, while the Hague
Convention does limit its application to cases sounding in contract,14 courts
seized for a primary claim of breach of contract are given no guidance on their
ability to decide or dismiss supplemental tort or personal injury claims.
Finally and most importantly, in instances where hearing a case is so
inconvenient that it could burden interstate commerce, the constitutionality of
the Hague Convention as applied is implicated.15
Given the concerns above, this Note argues that the U.S. should ratify the
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements with accompanying
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16. Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 19.
17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (2006).  For a deeper analysis of these provisions, see infra Part I.B.
18. 330 U.S. at 501.
19. See, e.g., Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1984) (upholding a forum
non conveniens dismissal based on the Gulf Oil standard even though plaintiffs argued no superior forum
existed).
20. Id. at 502.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 503.
legislation, a declaration on the meaning of Article 5 of the Hague
Convention, and a declaration that indicates exactly when U.S. courts will be
empowered to decline jurisdiction.  This declaration should be narrowly
tailored and should ensure that the dispute can and will be heard in another
forum.  Such a declaration likely comports with the Hague Convention’s
proscription of declarations limiting jurisdiction.16  Part I of this Note explores
the development of various doctrines of declining jurisdiction in the U.S. with
a focus on forum non conveniens, as well as current legal developments in the
field of choice-of-court clauses.  Part II analyzes the interaction of the text of
the Convention with these doctrines, giving special attention to the rationale
behind the limitation of courts’ discretion, and problems with this rationale.
Part III proposes a model text for the U.S. declaration, clearly delineating
cases in which courts should decline jurisdiction.
I.  FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND OTHER DOCTRINES FOR
DECLINING JURISDICTION
A.  American Forum Non Conveniens
Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine.  While some effort has
been made at the federal level to deal with the problem of an inconvenient
forum with legislation on transfer,17 forum non conveniens remains primarily
a creation of the courts.  States have various policies on declining jurisdiction;
however, the Supreme Court laid out a single policy for federal courts in Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.18  This policy is now followed in many states.19
In Gulf Oil, a Virginia plaintiff sued a Pennsylvania defendant in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.20  The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s negligence in transporting gasoline
caused a fire that destroyed his warehouse in Lynchburg.21  Although
jurisdiction and venue were proper, the district court nonetheless dismissed
the suit.22  In affirming the district court’s decision, the Supreme Court held
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23. Id. at 504, 512.
24. Id. at 507.
25. Id. at 508.
26. Id. at 508-09.
27. Id. at 508.
28. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
29. Id. at 239.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 238-39.
32. Id. at 239-40.
33. Id. at 240.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 241.
that federal courts may apply forum non conveniens where venue and
jurisdiction are proper, but another court is far more convenient and
appropriate.23  The Court was concerned that requiring courts to rely solely on
the “open door” of the broadly constructed rules of venue and jurisdiction
“may admit those who seek not simply justice but perhaps justice blended
with some harassment.  A plaintiff sometimes is under temptation to resort to
a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary,
even at some inconvenience to himself.”24  The Court listed multiple factors
to be considered when applying the doctrine—namely, interests of the private
litigant, such as the “relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses”;25 and interests of the public sector, such as
congestion of the docket and tortuous conflict-of-laws problems.26  Weighing
these factors, the balance must tilt decisively in favor of the defendant if
forum non conveniens dismissal is to be exercised.27
The seminal application of Gulf Oil in the international context is Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.28  In Piper, Scottish plaintiffs brought a wrongful death
claim against both the manufacturer of the airplane that crashed and caused
the decedent’s death, as well as the manufacturer of the propeller of the
airplane.29  Defendant Piper manufactured the plane in Pennsylvania;
Defendant Hartzell manufactured the propeller in Ohio.30  The plane, which
was registered in Great Britain, crashed in Scotland.31  Nevertheless, the
plaintiffs filed suit in a California state court.32  The plaintiffs readily admitted
that their decision was made because of the availability of more favorable tort
standards (such as strict liability and expanded capacity to sue).33  After the
defendants removed the case to federal court and transferred it to the Middle
District of Pennsylvania,34 the district court dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds.35  In upholding the dismissal, the Supreme Court said that
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36. Id. at 255.
37. See id. at 249-50.
38. See, e.g., id. at 252-53.
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (2006); see id. at 253.
40. § 1404(a).
41. § 1406(a).
42. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S.
612 (1964); Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 71 (1949).
43. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
44. Id. at 615.
45. See id. at 616, 633-39.
the general deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum is lessened where the
plaintiff is foreign.36  In addition, the Court held that an unfavorable change
in substantive law should not be given conclusive weight in a forum non
conveniens analysis; the question is whether an alternative forum exists and
is more convenient, not whether that forum offers the same legal framework.37
B.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406: The Statutory Codification of Transfer in the
Federal System
Originally, courts could use forum non conveniens to dismiss where the
appropriate forum was another federal court, assuming (or often stipulating)
that the more appropriate district would take up the case.38  Congress enacted
28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 to standardize the process whereby district courts
move cases from one district to another.39  Generally speaking, these cases fall
into two categories: Where the plaintiff originally sues in a forum where
venue is properly laid, the court may transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) “for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.”40  Where the plaintiff
originally sues in a forum where venue is improper, the court must either
dismiss or transfer to a proper district or division according to § 1406(a).41
The jurisprudence interpreting these two statutes is substantial.42  For
purposes of this Note, beyond the basic statutory structure, it is essential to
understand the framework a court uses to determine the applicable law in the
case of a transfer.  In Van Dusen v. Barrack,43 the Supreme Court considered
whether the transferee or transferor court’s law would apply after a § 1404(a)
transfer.44  Given that the statute is one concerned with the convenience of the
parties, the Court held that a § 1404 transfer is simply a change of location,
and if the plaintiff files in a proper venue the first time, her choice should not
be disturbed, and the law of the transferor court should apply.45  Further, the
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46. See id. at 623-24.
47. See Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1108 (5th Cir. 1981).
48. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
49. Id. at 12.
50. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
51. Id. at 595.
52. See id. at 593.
53. G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 436 (1993).
54. See, e.g., Jeffery L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 445, 491-93 (1994).
55. Id.
56. Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 132 (1984).
Van Dusen Court held that § 1404 transfers can be used to cure a technical
difficulty that prevents the plaintiff from filing in the transferee court.46
Conversely, if the transfer is pursuant to § 1406, the plaintiff should not be
rewarded for an incorrect choice of venue, and the transferee court’s law
should apply.47
C.  American Jurisdictional Jurisprudence As It Relates to Choice-of-Court
Clauses
American courts are currently highly amenable to freedom of contract as
it relates to choice-of-court clauses.  In M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,48
the Supreme Court held that where choice of forum is “made in an arm’s-
length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen, . . . absent
some compelling and countervailing reason it should be honored by the parties
and enforced by the courts.”49  In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,50 the
Supreme Court held that a choice-of-forum clause on a passenger’s cruise
ticket was valid so long as the passenger had notice and the clause was not
created in bad faith.51  The logic in Carnival Cruise Lines seems to suggest
that at this point the Court is unconcerned with the relative bargaining power
of parties to a contract containing a choice-of-court clause.52  The Supreme
Court has been described by one observer as having a “preoccupation with
contract enforcement.”53
Recent years have shown a theoretical and practical discontent with the
Supreme Court’s ignorance of the potential pitfalls of deference to contract.
Scholars have disparaged the harsh result of constantly relying on the
autonomy of the parties.54  They have suggested alternatives ranging from the
evaluation of a contract’s fairness to the parties as a factual question,55 and the
striking of terms that contravene “strong” default rules,56 to a presumption of
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57. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174,
1176 (1983).
58. See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Towards Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194 (2004) (describing a study that found 235 reported cases
in 2002-2003 involving an unconscionability defense to contract—an increase of over 400% over twenty
years—and, of those 235, 100 judgments of unconscionability by the courts).
59. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).  Section 2 specifically provides that contractual agreements to arbitrate
are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”  Id. § 2.
60. See Randall, supra note 58, at 214-16.
61. See id. (describing courts’ willingness to uphold similar clauses that do not involve arbitration).
62. See, e.g., Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (describing arbitration
clauses as an attempt “to shield [defendant] from liability”).
63. Id. at 1177.
64. Id.
65. 211 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2000).
66. Id. at 497-98.
67. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
unenforceability of form terms.57  Litigants have asked courts more frequently
to entertain the notion that all or part of the contract suffers from
unconscionability, and courts have more consistently agreed.58
The courts have been most consistently active in invalidating clauses that
proscribe one’s right to sue in court.  Arbitration clauses, despite the possible
protection of the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),59 are likely to be subject to scrutiny and rendered unenforceable.60
Professor Susan Randall believes that the courts in this context are treating
arbitration “differently” than other contract clauses.61  While it is beyond the
scope of this Note to question the legality of such disparate treatment for
purposes of the FAA, the language of the cases themselves reveals a specific
concern for the substantive unconscionability of subjecting a party to an
expensive foreign tribunal that would exact high travel and transaction costs.62
In Comb v. PayPal, Inc., the court refused to enforce a forum-selection
clause in an arbitration agreement that would have required a consumer to
arbitrate any claims against the defendant in a Santa Clara, CA, arbitration
house.63  Using a reasonableness standard, the court found that the “arbitration
clause serves to shield PayPal from liability instead of providing a neutral
forum in which to arbitrate disputes.”64
Neither have courts been entirely kind to agreements to litigate over this
recent period.  In Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc.,65 the court invalidated a
forum-selection clause that would have required a California franchisee to
litigate a franchise agreement in Pennsylvania.66  Applying Bremen,67 the
Jones court held that the forum-selection clause violated California’s strong
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68. Jones, 211 F.3d at 497-98.  The court discussed but did not rule on the other prong of the
Bremen test—namely that the clause might be unenforceable if the plaintiff could show that it would, for
all practical purposes, deprive him “of his day in court.”  Id. at 497 n.11 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972)).
69. Id. at 498.
70. See Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240 (Mont. 1998).
71. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 271; Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal
Separations, June 1, 1970, 8 I.L.M. 31.
72. Ronald A. Brand, Intellectual Property, Electronic Commerce and the Preliminary Draft Hague
public policy of preventing its residents from being subjected to harmful
foreign litigation.68  This policy was embodied in a California statute
restricting the operation of such clauses.69  At least one other court has used
a similar statute to invalidate a forum-selection clause.70
Combining the logic of Comb and Jones, courts are likely amenable to at
least some sort of argument where extreme forum-selection clauses in
international contracts could be invalidated.  Comb provides a framework for
arguing that forum selection can be used as a tool to dissuade dispute
resolution.  Its logic is just as applicable to litigation as to arbitration.  Jones
indicates that courts are concerned about business-to-business contracts that
may impinge upon the ability of smaller domestic businesses to fully defend
themselves or litigate wrongdoing.
I do not contend that forum-selection clauses should be per se invalid.  It
is likely that, much of the time, the rule supporting enforcement of forum
selection clauses reaches a result that is at once just and efficient.  However,
Comb suggests that there might be times where a forum is not selected to
reduce costs and provide a centralized location for grievances, but rather to
oppress a contrary party.  I contend that courts should be wary of this
possibility and apply both determinations on the bargaining power of the
parties and notions of forum non conveniens to their analyses.
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEM ENTATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
AND ITS EFFECT ON FORUM NON CONVENIENS
A.  History: The Abandoned Preliminary Draft Convention and the Current
Convention
In the 1970s, the Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted
two treaties pertaining to civil jurisdiction.71  These treaties were not ratified
widely enough to create significant effect.72  In 1996, after numerous requests
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Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 581, 582 (2001).
73. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Eighteenth Session Final Act, at 21 (Oct. 19,
1996).
74. 1998 O.J. (C27) 1.
75. See Brand, supra note 72, at 583-86.
76. See, e.g., id. at 603.
77. Brand, supra note 7, at 345.
78. Id. at 346.
79. Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 1.
80. Id. art. 3(b).
81. Id. art. 5(1).
82. Id. art. 6.
83. Id. art. 8.
84. See, e.g., Draft Report, supra note 11, at 23.
from the United States, the Hague Conference began work on another treaty
“on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters.”73  Professor Ronald Brand notes that the intent was to
codify a system of determining whether or not any court anywhere in the
world could or must hear a case—sort of a corollary to the EU’s Brussels
Regulation74 or the U.S.’s Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses for
the entire world.75  The Hague Conference completed work on the Preliminary
Draft Convention (PDC) in 2001, and many commentators expected that this
treaty, although described as opaque and suffering from a number of
problems, would be ratified in some form.76  However, the rules this
convention created were unacceptable to the United States, and the PDC was
abandoned for a smaller, more palatable project on jurisdiction as it pertained
to the use of choice-of-court clauses.77  This project eventually became the
Hague Convention.
The current Hague Convention has been described as a litigation
counterpart to the New York Convention.78  It applies only to business-to-
business contracts with “exclusive” choice-of-court clauses.79  It sets up a
presumption that a choice-of-court agreement is exclusive where only one
court or country is named.80  Generally speaking, courts named in exclusive
choice-of-court clauses have jurisdiction.81  Conversely, courts not named in
exclusive choice-of-court clauses do not have jurisdiction and are required to
decline to hear the case.82  Judgments reached in accordance with the Hague
Convention are to be recognized and enforced in courts of member states.83
Even though the PDC was ultimately abandoned, the Hague Conference’s
original research into judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction influenced the
text of the current Hague Convention.84  Early research was concerned with
the problems presented for such a treaty where individual countries had
176 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:165
85. See generally Hague Conference on Private International Law, Note on the Question of “Forum
Non Conveniens” in the Perspective of a Double Convention on Judicial Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Decisions, Prelim. Doc. No. 3 (Apr. 1996), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_
pd03(1996).pdf.
86. Draft Report, supra note 11, at 23.
87. Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(2).
88. Id.  Note, however, that the Hague Convention specifically requires subject matter jurisdiction
to exist independent of the treaty.  See id. art. 5(3)(a).
89. Id. art. 5(1).
90. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
91. Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 5(3)(b).
92. Id.; see Draft Report, supra note 11, at 23 (“[A]rticle 5(2) would not preclude a transfer to a
federal court in a different state of the United States of America.”).
developed disparate and often confusing guidelines for declining
jurisdiction.85  Drafters emphasized that it is essential for the functioning of
a treaty on jurisdiction that at least one court empowered to hear the case must
be required to do so;86 otherwise, the entire codification of when to hear or not
to hear a case reverts to the current system of a judiciary interpreting vague
and broad standards.
B.  Article 5
1.  The Rule
The drafters solved the problem described above by inserting the bright-
line rule of Article 5.87  Courts chosen by the parties are stripped of their
discretion to decline to hear the dispute.88  There are two exceptions.  First, a
court may decline jurisdiction where the agreement is null and void under the
law of the state of the chosen court.89  Given the United States’ reluctance to
invalidate choice-of-court clauses based on unequal bargaining power of the
parties,90 however, this exception may not come into play in domestic courts.
Second, the Hague Convention specifically allows member states to allocate
jurisdiction internally without violating the treaty.91  It requests that “due
consideration be given to the choice of the parties,” but transfer is still an
option.92
2.  Procedural Critiques of Article 5
The frustration undoubtedly felt by the Hague Conference in drafting a
clause to deal with forum non conveniens and related doctrines is
understandable.  Jurisprudence in this area has been referred to as “a crazy
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93. Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court Access Doctrine, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 781, 785 (1985).
94. Peter J. Carney, International Forum Non Conveniens: “Section 1404.5”—A Proposal in the
Interest of Sovereignty, Comity, and Individual Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 415, 451-52 (1995).
95. See Jeffrey A. Liesemer, Note, Carnival’s Got the Fun . . . and the Forum: A New Look at
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quilt of ad hoc, capricious, and inconsistent decisions.”93  Some experts have
also noted that the doctrine enables savvy defendants, especially large U.S.
corporations doing business abroad, to avoid litigation in their home forum for
torts committed abroad.94  These critiques notwithstanding, the text of Article
5 presents various problems that require Congress’s attention when
considering ratification.
First, as often occurs with bright-line rules, Article 5 is over-inclusive.
While the general rule of freedom of contract is a highly lauded general
principle of developed legal systems the world over (especially in the U.S.),
it may not always be the best default.95  There are several reasons to question
the wisdom of granting parties absolute, unsupervised autonomy in the
decision of what court can hear their case.96  Arguably, however, this is
precisely the rule in the New York Convention, and contract drafters have
relied on this rule effectively for decades.97  This view ignores the essential
nature of courts as official state organs.  Courts are in the business of
administering justice for their respective territories, quite different from an
arbitration house’s charge of hearing disputes for paying customers while
maximizing profit.  Returning to the original hypothetical, it seems unrealistic
to expect Arkansas to expend taxpayer dollars and the time of a trial court to
hear cases that have no connection to the forum solely because of a perceived
expertise or bias in cases involving large retail chains.
Second, the concern about trials in unconnected venues is exacerbated by
the ability of parties such as those in the hypothetical to research their court
choice and engage in pre-emptive forum shopping.  Parties could use Article
5 to designate courts with favorably-minded judges, auspicious conflict rules,
or simply a court that is so inconvenient for the other party that entering
litigation is discouraged and defending a claim is prohibitively expensive.  Put
simply, the policy concerns for private and public interests laid out by the
Piper court98 remain pertinent despite the Hague Conference’s attempt to
ignore them.
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Third, the Hague Convention explicitly does not apply to tort claims.99
Presumably, a court that may not decline jurisdiction over a Hague
Convention claim may still apply its own rules for declining jurisdiction on
supplemental claims.  Assume that a Little Grill Guy product spontaneously
combusted in a Tokyo-Mart in Sapporo, injuring customers.  Tokyo-Mart now
wishes to bring a breach of contract claim against Little Grill Guy, as well as
a claim for indemnification against any award those injured customers might
receive in Japan against the deep pockets of Tokyo-Mart.  The Arkansas court
could conceivably decline to hear the indemnification claim based on the
Piper analysis for forum non conveniens without violating the treaty.100
Tokyo-Mart would be free at this point to file a claim in the Allegheny County
Court of Common Pleas—the state-level court of the county where LGG
resides—or in Japan (provided, of course, that Japanese jurisdictional and
venue rules create sufficient power to hale Little Grill Guy into court).  The
litigants and the court system are now faced with resolving two separate
proceedings on substantially the same set of facts, separated by the lack of a
uniform rule.
3.  Article 5, State Courts, and the Constitution
Article 5 calls into question not only matters of American civil procedure
but could create constitutional difficulties.  Suppose Little Grill Guy is
actually Petit Gars de Gril, a corporation with its primary place of business in
Marseilles, France.  The form contract still contains the same choice-of-court
clause, and Tokyo-Mart files suit in Bentonville.  This fact pattern now bears
some similarity to a Supreme Court case concerning the exercise of a court’s
jurisdiction and its impact on interstate commerce.
In Davis v. Farmers’ Co-operative Equity Co.,101 the Court considered an
assertion of jurisdiction by a Minnesota court over a dispute between two
parties engaged in the shipment of grain in Kansas.102  The shipment never
entered Minnesota.103  The two parties involved were Kansas corporations “in
no way connected with Minnesota.”104  The Minnesota court asserted
jurisdiction by relying on an interpretation of a jurisdictional statute which
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made any firm amenable to service of process where it had an agent in the
state for the purpose of soliciting freight or passenger traffic.105  In reversing
the decision, the Court held that such a far-reaching jurisdictional assertion
would be “obnoxious to the [C]ommerce [C]lause.”106  Justice Brandeis
reasoned that such a statute would subject anyone doing business as a carrier
to suit in that state, or any other state that saw fit to enact such a statute.107  As
the orderly administration of interstate transportation is in the interest of
interstate commerce, to uphold the jurisdictional and venue statute would
impinge upon that interest.108
At least one commentator critiqued this constitutional theory of declining
jurisdiction as “short-lived,” reasoning that it is implicitly overruled by forum
non conveniens.109  However, the Gulf Oil court favorably cited the Davis
decision, saying that “the use of an inappropriate forum” could be “an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.”110  Also, commentators have
praised the rationale behind this rule.111
Like the Minnesota court in Davis, state courts empowered by the Hague
Convention could undoubtedly pose a substantial burden to interstate
commerce.  Resolving a dispute unrelated to the adjudicating court would
likely foster an increase in the costs and length of litigation to the point where
state courts become a wrench in the gears of international business.  Extending
to such a court the right to hear a dispute just because the parties chose the
forum would lead to parties exiting the international market for fear of
protracted, overly costly litigation.
Unlike the assertion of jurisdiction in Davis, the Hague Convention
would be somewhat protected by Congress’s Treaty Power and the Supremacy
Clause.  Perhaps Congress is relinquishing its right to control interstate
commerce by passing such a treaty.  Still, this protection presents a theoretical
concern.  Congress would be utilizing a constitutional provision to protect a
constitutional violation.  Arguably, the power of Congress to approve treaties,
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and the constitutional authority granted to those treaties, does not extend to
the possibility that those treaties may upset the constitutional order.
Experts have confronted just this issue earlier in the planning process for
the Hague Convention.  When the Hague Conference was contemplating a
broader based treaty for jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters,
American experts were divided on the question of whether U.S. notions of
appropriate jurisdiction would trump those of the treaty.112  Professor Andrew
Strauss argued that the Constitution recognizes the difference between internal
power (left to domestic organs) and external power (left to international
law);113 because jurisdiction is about allocation of power to sub-units,
Professor Strauss argued that it is to be administered externally and thus the
treaty would trump jurisdictional doctrine.114  Professor Cox argued that limits
on jurisdiction apply to Congressional attempts to authorize jurisdiction;115
thus, domestic understanding on limits on jurisdiction must trump the treaty.116
These professors analyzed the problem before the treaty was trimmed
down to simply a contractual analysis, and their concerns are more about Due
Process limits on the empowerment of courts rather than other potential
constitutional limits on inconvenient forums, but the divide on the new issue
is likely to mirror the old debate.  Could limits on states’ ability to affect
interstate commerce thus limit Congress’s ability to authorize the abrogation
of those limits?  Or could this problem be characterized as Congress actually
regulating interstate commerce by delegating authority to the states?117
Practically, however, even if one resolves the conflict in favor of the
treaty, the logic behind the dormant Commerce Clause still exists.  States
should not hamper interstate commerce, regardless of their intentions.118  The
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federal system of uniform and smooth interstate and international commerce
is a factor in the U.S.’s rise to dominance in this context and should not be
disturbed.
III.  A PROPOSAL FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The United States must act to ensure the healthy functioning of its
judiciary under the Hague Convention.  Congressional legislation can ensure
that courts are not overburdened, parties are not abused, and the constitutional
system sits undisturbed.  My proposal for such congressional action is
threefold.  First, Congress should enact legislation providing federal question
jurisdiction for breach-of-contract cases involving international contracts that
contain a choice-of-court clause.  This would allow parties like LGG, who are
subject to unfavorable choice of court agreements (especially those not
negotiated at arms length), to move for removal to federal court.  Second,
when ratifying the treaty, Congress and the President should include a
declaration that it interprets Article 5(3)(b) as being consistent with 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1404, 1406.  This would give domestic defendants who successfully
remove to federal court the opportunity to transfer the case to a more
convenient forum.  Lastly, the Executive and Congress should file a narrow
declaration to Article 5 which would prevent forum non conveniens dismissals
in cases where the contractually named forum has no connection to the dispute
and an alternative, more convenient forum only exists abroad.  These steps are
discussed in more detail below, along with alternative solutions that are
ultimately insufficient.
A.  Legislation to Create Federal Question Jurisdiction So As to Allow For
Removal
This step is likely superfluous; most often, parties engaged in this sort of
litigation will satisfy the diversity requirements of federal jurisdiction119 and
can remove in that manner without new legislation.120  The concern over
inconvenient litigation is lessened where the suit takes place in the
defendant’s home forum, so removal is not as urgent in this situation.121  Still,
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the Hague Convention may apply to many small contracts that do not reach the
amount-in-controversy requirement.122  Congress is certainly within its
Commerce Clause or Treaty Clause powers to enact legislation providing
federal question jurisdiction for international business-to-business contracts
covered by the Hague Convention.  A suggested text is below:
Any person who breaches an international contract for civil or commercial matters
that contains a choice-of-court clause to which the Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements applies shall be liable to the non-breaching party in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress in a District Court of these
United States.  Remedies for this breach are to be determined by the law applicable
to the contract.
Such a text would give parties that are concerned about their ability to
effectively represent themselves in a far away state court the ability to remove
the case to federal court.  Because the removal statutes only allow defendants
to remove, there is very little potential for domestic firms to game their
business partners by disingenuously agreeing to an inconvenient forum only
to sue and immediately remove the case.123  The protection sought here is
primarily intended for domestic defendants, who would be assured by this
legislation that their dispute would not require their presence in an
inconvenient state court.
Removal would also lessen the problem of resolving supplemental claims
sounding in tort, antitrust, or other matters not covered by the Hague
Convention.  The removal statutes and supplemental jurisdiction rules would
bring along a related claim into federal court,124 where the next two legislative
actions would prove useful.
B.  A Declaration on U.S. Interpretation of Article 5(3)(b)
The United States should file a declaration with its ratification of the
Hague Convention stating that its reading of Article 5(3)(b) is consistent with
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406.  Such a declaration would allow
a federal court, when the transfer statutes are satisfied, to move the case to
another district court.  Thus, domestic defendants could at least ensure that
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litigation in an unconnected forum could be moved to some other forum,
either where the events leading to the breach occurred, or if the events
occurred abroad, at least to the defendant’s home forum.  Also, the choice-of-
law rule set out in Van Dusen v. Barrack,125 coupled with this declaration,
ensures that the parties’ choice of law is not unduly disturbed and the use of
transfer is only driven by the purpose of making the litigation more
convenient.  Moreover, the removal-transfer regime suggested does not
require that U.S. courts declare the choice-of-court provision in the parties’
agreement null and void, as suggested by Article 5;126 thus, the U.S. preference
for honoring choice-of-court agreements stands firm except in the most
unpalatable of cases, and even then only allows a transfer in the interest of
convenience.
Despite the protections inherent in the existing statutory scheme for
removal and transfer, there is still potential for abuse by domestic firms.
Recall the original hypothetical and switch the nationality of the parties such
that the retail firm is American and the manufacturer is Japanese.  Also,
imagine that the American firm is simply unable to negotiate a choice-of-court
provision designating their home (here, assume Bentonville, Arkansas) as the
chosen court.  Given the system just described, the American firm could
simply designate some court in the U.S. that would likely never have a
significant connection to the dispute, knowing that if it is sued there, it may
simply remove and transfer the case back to Bentonville.127  Although such a
scenario is somewhat less troubling than if the removal statute permitted
plaintiffs to transfer, Congress should still protect the freedom of contract
from this sort of gaming.  To do so, the declaration should include an
explanation of Congress’s interpretation of “due consideration” in Article 5.128
This interpretation should suggest that removal and transfer are appropriate
where the forum chosen has no connection to the dispute and justice is better
served by a court in another district.
This scheme may not comport with the Hague Convention’s
understanding of federal systems.  In Article 25, the Convention makes clear
that in “non-unified” systems (presumably including the American federal
system), “any reference to the court or courts of a State shall be construed as
referring, where appropriate, to the court or courts in the relevant territorial
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unit.”129  Where a choice-of-court clause refers to “the courts of the State of
Arkansas,” the Treaty appears to interpret that phrase as referring only to state
or federal courts within Arkansas.  This definition could possibly operate to
prevent the use of § 1404 or § 1406 transfer.  Nevertheless, one could argue
that transfer remains viable as an exercise of power by the named court.
Further, because transfer does not operate as a dismissal, it likely does not
prejudice the claim from being heard and simply moves it to a more
convenient forum.  Still, the possible construction of Article 25 to limit the
ability of courts to transfer cases within the federal system may frustrate the
plan outlined above.
C.  A Narrowly-Tailored Declaration to Article 5(2)
As contemplated above, the removal-transfer scheme may simply be too
radical a departure from the Hague Convention’s treatment of federal systems.
If Congress indeed determines that any declaration designed to allow the
federal courts to transfer cases to other districts exceeds the proscriptions in
Article 25, it should consider an alternative to at least prevent the most
egregious abuses of choice-of-court clauses from taking advantage of the
Hague Convention.
Further, even if the removal-transfer scheme is implemented as
contemplated, it may be insufficient to deal with certain anomalous cases.  For
example, the removal-transfer scheme described above works well where an
appropriate forum exists in the United States.  While this may well be the case
where at least one of the contracting parties is a U.S. firm, it may not be the
case where the parties are all foreign, and the forum was chosen absent any
connection to the parties’ relationship or the dispute.  Parties could choose to
do this for a variety of reasons.  Perhaps they are impressed with the acumen
of the Delaware Chancery Court.  Perhaps they recognize a bias in a particular
forum.  Perhaps they simply realize that the party across the table will be
dissuaded from entering suit if the forum is a federal district court in
Anchorage.
Whatever the reason, the United States should file a narrowly-tailored
declaration to Article 5(2) stipulating that its courts are empowered to decline
jurisdiction when the following five conditions are met:
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a. The parties involved in the contract are not U.S. persons and have no connection
to the forum other than the choice-of-court agreement;
b. The events that gave rise to the claim did not occur in the forum;
c. The interest factors described in Gulf Oil argue strongly for forum non
conveniens dismissal,130 especially those related to the public interest;131
d. The removal-transfer scheme described above would not adequately remedy the
issues at play in (c); and
e. Another more convenient forum is available to settle the dispute; if necessary,
dismissal will be conditional upon the assent of the parties to jurisdiction and
venue abroad.
Courts should utilize this declaration to grant a forum non conveniens
dismissal only in the most egregious of cases.  Their dismissals should be
conditional upon the assent of the parties to another jurisdiction.  Because we
are concerned with abuses by the plaintiff, and because jurisdiction is most
likely not a problem for the plaintiff, courts should not have to worry about an
abusive plaintiff simply refusing to assent to any other jurisdiction after a brief
amount of discovery and testimony reveals an alternative forum to which the
defendant has now agreed.  While this conditional dismissal would require the
court to resolve that portion of the dispute and thus make factual findings, it
is likely that these proceedings would impose less of a nuisance than a
comprehensive ruling on the merits.
The Hague Convention itself creates difficulty for this solution.  As
previously stated, a court not named in the choice-of-court agreement should
decline to hear the case according to the Convention.132  Therefore, a new
forum approached by the two parties just dismissed by the U.S. court might
decline to hear the case.  However, this general rule likely fades if both parties
have acquiesced to the impracticability of their original decision and settled
on this new forum.
Some might suggest that even this narrow declaration cuts too closely to
the central purpose of the Treaty.  After all, the general principle underlying
the Hague Convention is that freedom of contract is paramount.  If there are
any exceptions at all, freedom of contract might lose its force as savvy parties
exploit loopholes.  However, this declaration affects a very small subset of
contracts covered under the Convention.  By selecting a U.S. forum, these
contracts would likely offend constitutional notions of jurisdiction and venue
even before the question of a forum non conveniens dismissal is reached.133
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The vast majority of international contracts placed at issue in front of a U.S.
court would receive a judgment from a U.S. court.  Only those that arrive here
based solely on a clause that appears illogical or unfair would be declined.
Further, such a declaration is explicitly allowed by the Hague Convention; in
actuality, the declaration as stated above is even narrower than that
contemplated in Article 19.134
D.  Other Alternatives, and Their Insufficiencies
1.  Rejection of the Treaty
After reading the critique of the Hague Convention’s handling of the
forum non conveniens question, many readers are likely to question the value
of the treaty in general.  The U.S. could avoid all of these questions by
rejecting the treaty out of hand and relying on its current jurisprudential
scheme to decide which cases it hears.
This reaction is overly harsh.  The Hague Convention would allow
international parties a legitimate choice between arbitration and litigation.
The New York Convention has been an overwhelming success, and its general
rule of freedom of contract has served the international business community
well.135  The U.S. in particular would benefit from the Hague Convention
because it would ensure that more U.S. judgments are recognized and
enforced abroad.  This has been a concern for many years as foreign courts are
uncomfortable with certain American conventions, such as punitive damages,
jury determinations, and the lack of attorney fee awards.136  The aim of this
paper is not to disparage the Hague Convention; rather, it simply suggests
potential conflicts and attempts to resolve them without advocating a
wholesale abandonment of what will ultimately be an effective scheme of
international law.
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2.  Broad Declaration to Article 5(2)
One might also consider simply reserving the right of U.S. courts to apply
a forum non conveniens analysis to cases governed by the Hague Convention.
There are two problems with this suggestion.  The first is contemplated in Part
III.C supra—namely, that a broad use of forum non conveniens offends the
central notion of the Treaty.137  Forum non conveniens dismissals are
inappropriate for the vast majority of these cases and would result in the treaty
losing force and effectiveness.  Because the central tenet of the treaty is a
valuable one, a broad rejection would not be in the U.S.’s interest.  Also, some
of the critiques of forum non conveniens as an arbitrary doctrine without
predictability or consistency would be alleviated by the proposed narrow
declaration.  Perhaps the guidance Congress would give on forum non
conveniens as it applies to international contract cases would influence the
jurisprudence of the courts on declining jurisdiction in other matters.
CONCLUSION
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements provides
businesses with the opportunity to enforce a favorable judgment on a breach
of contract in other countries.  This is a laudable position.  Still, its rule
presents concerns for firms out-bargained into a clause that provides them no
meaningful opportunity for dispute resolution, as well as for the courts
charged with resolving such disputes.  By adapting pre-existing procedural
safeguards to conform to the new realities of the Treaty, the U.S. can provide
parties with protection from, and courts with a framework for curing, these
problems.
